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CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW: THE ENGLISH 
CRIMINAL JURY 
Robert C. Palmer* 
VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE. By Thomas Andrew Green. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1985. Pp. xx, 409. $34. 
The criminal trial jury has played a central role in Anglo-Ameri-
can history both for the maintenance of order and in the constitutional 
limitation of governmental power. The jury is an occasion for famil-
iarization of the citizenry with governmental process - a process of 
co-optation and indoctrination - as well as a means of qualifying 
power by inserting into the governmental process lay and communal 
standards. But those standards are discretionary, and the discretion-
ary aspect of the jury, particularly for those subject to its workings, is 
simultaneously worrying and hopeful. 
Verdict According to Conscience analyzes jury c:J.iscretion in Eng-
land from the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries. The scope itself 
makes the work extraordinarily ambitious. And Green's accomplish-
ment is impressive; he has produced a stimulating, thought-provoking 
study. His focus on jury discretion - the operation of conscience in 
the rendering of verdicts - yields an intriguing investigation of jury 
behavior; it also provides a helpful overview of the development of the 
criminal trial jury into a constitutional right. The book's substance 
demonstrates thoughtful consideration of the issues involved. Its ex-
emplary organization, with frequent summaries and clearly explained 
theses, exhibits an extraordinary degree of concern for the reader. 
Verdict According to Conscience is in three parts: medieval (Ori-
gins), early modem (Transformations), and eighteenth century (Reso-
lutions). Each part contains three chapters. Roughly, the first chapter 
in each part is an institutional overview; the second examines the role 
of conscience in trials; the third explores the interaction between jury 
and bench necessitated by such jury behavior. As might be expected, 
however, the institutional chapters tend also to include arguments re-
lating to jury behavior; in the second part the institutional overview 
also provides the chronological coverage of the jury under the Tudors 
and first Stuarts. The parts also involve different approaches to the 
topic. The medieval portion is heavily grounded in analysis of com-
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mon-run criminal trials; the other two parts are more, but not exclu-
sively, concerned with treatises and classic great cases. 
Green demonstrates a continuity of discretion in the medieval 
criminal trial jury. When criminal prosecutions utilized presentment 
jilries and the ordeal, the presentment jury presented only those really 
suspected, protecting those only slightly suspect. When the trial jury 
replaced the ordeal in the 1220s as the normal method of proof, it 
assumed part of the discretionary activity of the presentment jury. 
That assumption of discretion was natural, because the same people 
often served on both juries. The overlap in membership became im-
practical in the early fourteenth century with the demise of the general 
eyre and the adoption of the commission of gaol delivery as the nor-
mal judicial commission for the trial of crimes. Nascent ideas of due 
process reinforced the physical and chronological separation between 
presentment and trial juries, so that by the mid-fourteenth century the 
accused faced two discrete panels1 (Chapter One). 
Green traces medieval nullification of the law primarily in homi-
cide cases. Late fourteenth-century coroners' rolls distinguished be-
tween "murder" (stealthy homicide) and simple homicide (roughly, 
manslaughter). That distinction was not legal, since the law dictated 
that both were capital offenses. But the same social distinction is de-
monstrable from standardized self-defense verdicts through the four-
teenth century, inferable from thirteenth-century evidence, and 
explicit through the beginning of the twelfth century. The jury felt 
free, from its inception, to render verdicts according to a social con-
ception that was fundamentally at variance with the letter of the law 
(Chap~er Two). 
This jury activity inevitably affected the structure of criminal law. 
The harsh simplicity of the legal structure within which the jury in-
serted its verdicts disguised the close cases and complicated factual 
situations that would have produced fine distinctions. Even so, four-
teenth-century criminal law was not static. The category of justifiable 
homicide grew to include the slaying of burglars, arsonists, and rob-
bers caught in the act, and accidental homicide ceased to require a 
pardon. But juries protected those guilty of simple homicide by classi-
fying them as self-defenders; that exercise of mercy, with the conse-
quent judicial suspicion of self-defenders, prevented the emergence of 
sophisticated criminal law. The history of jury nullification of the law 
explains the structure of medieval criminal law (Chapter Three). 
Two factors distinguished the early modem jury from the medieval 
jury. By far the more important was the development of the prosecu-
tor. The Marian bail and commitment statutes of 1554-1555 assured 
that there would be an official version of the case available to judge 
1. The separation between trial and presentment juries also resulted in trial juries of a lower 
social standing, prompting growing governmental concern about the jury. 
February-April 1986] The English Criminal Jury 789 
and jury and that witnesses would be bound over to give evidence 
against the accused. The interest in evidence meant that the jury was 
no longer to be self-informing; the presentation of evidence prompted 
judicial commentary together with the charge to the jury. Judges also 
attempted to manage the jury by fining jurors or binding them over for 
examination by Star Chamber. And the presentation of complicated 
life situations to the court instead of standardized verdicts allowed the 
rapid formulation of a much more complex criminal law. The devel-
opment of this prosecutorial side meant less jury discretion. 
At the same time, another institutional factor made the former 
jury discretion less necessary: the availability of a serious but noncapi-
tal punishment for simple homicide. In the fifteenth century benefit of 
clergy had become available in practice to almost any male offender. 
Thereafter Parliament excluded the worst categories of offenders from 
access, but simple homicides retained the benefit. Punishment for 
such first offenses was branding and imprisonment. The ready availa-
bility of benefit of clergy for simple homicide removed the major area 
of disagreement between the formal criminal law and social attitudes, 
with the result that the reduced jury role in law nullification was with-
out controversy (Chapter Four). 
The continuous history of jury discretion, Green argues, made pos-
sible the Leveller argument that jurors were judges of the law. Green 
uses John Lilburne's trials to trace the development of that radical 
pro-discretion, anti-rule conceptualization of the jury. Until 
Lilbume's 1649 trial Leveller rhetoric about the jury was relatively 
traditional, insisting on local trials and local jurors but adopting the 
law /fact distinction between the functions of judges and jurors. After 
the 1649 trial a theory rapidly developed of total jury control over the 
law, analogous to lay control over the interpretation of Scripture. 
Then, in his 1653 trial, Lilbume enunciated a radical theory of jury 
nullification of statute if the jury considered the statute discordant 
with English fundamental law (Chapter Five). 
The recognition of a jury right against coercion incorporated part 
of the Leveller tradition. Bushel, as a juror, responded to Penn's argu-
ment that jurors were judges of the law and acquitted him contrary to 
the evidence. Imprisoned for his recalcitrance, he came before the 
king's court by habeas corpus. On that matter Vaughan wrote his fa-
mous opinion establishing the jury right against coercion. He based 
his opinion not on the jury's right to nullify the law, but on its right to 
find fact. For Vaughan, law did not exist in the abstract; it grew out of 
fact. Denying the possibility of ascertaining completely objective 
facts, Vaughan refused to second-guess the jurors' determinations, 
since their job was to ascertain fact and apply the law to it. The pro-
cess was too complex, law and fact too intricately interwoven, and jury 
right over fact-finding too secure to justify judicial disciplining of ju-
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rors. Vaughan effectively hid the jury's power over the law within its 
power over fact (Chapter Six). 
Further major change in the criminal trial occurred only late in :the 
eighteenth century or early in the nineteenth century, with the increas-
ing intervention of lawyers in criminal cases and the development of a 
law of evidence. That development lies outside the scope of Green's 
analysis. But completely within the eighteenth century the Crown be-
came much more selective in its prosecution. With the availability of 
transportation as a punishment and with the jury right against coer-
cion, the bench openly admitted the jury into its role of mitigation. 
While this explicit exercise of authority contrary to oath elicited much 
criticism, no one doubted its necessity until the law of sanctions was 
altered. The growing conviction that social factors qualified free will 
made such reform seem all the more pressing, but it also made the 
temporary retention of jury mitigation to avoid capital punishment all 
the more necessary. And the constitutional role of the jury was such 
that no one wanted to eliminate completely the possibility of jury nul-
lification of the law (Chapter Seven). 
Judicial acceptance of jury mitigation in felony cases, however, 
contradicted the law of seditious libel. In prosecutions for criticism 
that undermined governmental authority, the bench tried to limit ju-
ries to determination only of publication, reserving the seditiousness of 
the tract as a matter oflaw. Writers regularly chose to analogize sedi-
tious libel with homicide rather than theft. Theft was considered uni-
formly and always bad, such that jury activity beyond the strict 
finding of fact would only be in mitigation of the rigor of the law. 
Homicide, however, was not always bad and could be justified. The 
jury in homicide thus had a more extensive role to play. If seditious 
libel was like theft, the bench could logically restrict the jury; if like 
homicide, it could not. Nonetheless, the acceptance of jury mitigation 
in felony inevitably affected the role of the jury in seditious libel. Fi-
nally, at the end of the eighteenth century, Fox's Libel Act allowed the 
jury in seditious libel cases to return a general verdict, a verdict thus 
that could determine the seditiousness of the tract (Chapter Eight). 
The lively tradition of respectable jury mitigation of the law ended, 
however, roughly with the eighteenth century. The development of 
the law of evidence and the intervention of counsel in criminal trials 
elevated the value of consistency in determination, whereas jury miti-
gation operated in a random manner. More to the point, parliamen-
tary reform of the law of sanctions eliminated many of the capital 
offenses that had made jury intervention seem necessary. Jury inter-
vention, while far from dead, no longer played the constitutional or 
normal role it once had (Chapter Nine). 
Green's view of jury activity is a complex of social, legal, and intel-
lectual history. Throughout he emphasizes the relationship between 
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jury activity, general social attitudes, and the formation of substantive 
law. That relationship was interactive, not linear. His versatility is 
impressive. His sensitivity to his sources and their context is laudable. 
He is confident of his sources, and he has established a framework for 
future research. The establishment of that framework is a great ser-
vice, even though the sheer volume of research on the criminal trial 
jury dictates that many of Green's particular arguments will be 
superseded. 
* * * * * * 
Verdict According to Conscience is above all a history of the crimi-
nal trial jury. But the criminal law was not a world to itself. Justices 
presided over both criminal and noncriminal juries. A priori, study of 
the normal common law jury should reinforce study of the criminal 
trial jury. Such a perspective, not usual among historians of medieval 
criminal law, alters the characterization of the Angevin revolution, the 
origins of trial jury discretion, and the continuation of jury discretion 
beyond its origins. 
The Assize of Clarendon2 (1166) and the Assize of Northampton3 
(1176) first mandated extensive use of presentment juries. Green por-
trays those enactments as a jurisdictional revolution: decisive royal 
assertion of "jurisdiction over trial and execution for all felony at the 
expense of existing, competing jurisdictions" (p. 7). Maitland simi-
larly characterized the origins of the possessory property actions as a 
decisive assertion of royal jurisdiction at the expense of competing ju-
risdictions. Newer scholarship portrays these legal changes as regula-
tory innovations, not as jurisdictional transfers.4 The question of 
appropriate characterization is relatively unimportant for Green's con-
cerns, but it affects the way in which his work relates to general legal 
history. 
Other Angevin legal innovations outside the context of property 
were regulatory. The Constitutions of Clarendon5 (1164) was an at-
tempt to set down English custom regarding conflicting royal and ec-
clesiastical matters; its primary concerns were regulatory. 6 That 
2. 1 SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 76-80 (C. Stephenson & F. Marcham 
eds. & trans. 1937). 
3. Id. at 80-83. 
4. s. MILSOM, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM (1976); Palmer, The Eco-
nomic and Cultural Impact of the Origins of Property, 1180-1220, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 375, 375-
96 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Palmer, Economic and Cultural Impact]; Palmer, The Feudal 
Framework of English Law (Book Review), 79 MICH. L. REV. 1130 (1981); Palmer, The Origins 
of Property in Eng/and, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (1985). 
5. SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 2, at 73-76. 
6. The traditional view considers the Constitutions of Clarendon as either a defense or an 
assertion of royal power. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 138-48 (2d ed. 1898); 2 id. at 198. The Constitutions were 
regulatory in that, while the king acknowledged a certain separateness to ecclesiastical organiza-
tion, he wanted to assure royal supervision, whether before his justices or in his feudal court. 
Chapters 2-4 and 7-12 accord with the regulatory purpose; the remaining chapters, 1, 5-6, and 
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provision preceded the Assize of Clarendon and mentioned present-
ment jurors who could be made available to ecclesiastical courts. 7 The 
regulatory context of this first major appearance of the presentment 
jury, together with the new view of noncriminal actions already men-
tioned, suggests a regulatory purpose behind the presentment jury pro-
vision in the Assize of Clarendon. 
The supposition that Angevin crime-oriented innovations were es-
sentially similar to other innovations demands a difficult reconceptual-
ization. The supposition receives some support from the con-
temporary perception that the provisions of the Assize of Clarendon 
and the Assize of Northampton were temporary.8 Jurisdictional 
transfers tend to be permanent. One could argue that the provision 
was regulatory in providing for royal supervision of preexisting pre-
sentment juries.9 A better argument would be that the presentment 
jury was not originally a strict alternative to private appeals of felony, 
but a mechanism to supervise such appeals. The presentment jury 
provided the accusation when the appeal procedure failed. That per-
ception allows a consistent portrayal of Henry II as not replacing 
older forms or consciously centralizing, but only assuring that current 
pi;ocedures operated effectively. 
Green derives the origins of juror discretion from the work of the 
early presentment jury. In this he relies on Groot's studies of the ori-
gins of the criminal trial jury and the activity of the prese~tment ju-
ries.10 Groot's work indicates a certain discretion on the part of the 
presentment jury, and his logic suggests likewise that the trial jury 
assumed part of that discretionary role (pp. 7-11). Green's reliance on 
Groot's work, however, leads to omission of the more important ele-
ment in the origins of jury discretion. 
Green's view represents the best of traditional scholarship. That 
tradition views the ordeal as asking essentially a factual question of 
God: did the accused commit a felonious homicide? Included in this 
factual question, but never spelled out, would be imponderables for 
which God would be eminently competent, such as mens rea. 11 While 
there is some documentary support for the factual nature of the ordeal 
13-16, separate out issues that would cause conflict. SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 73-76. 
7. Constitutions of Clarendon, c. 6. 
8. Groot, The Jury of Presentment Before 1215, 26 AM. J. LEGAL Htsr. 1, 4 (1982); 
Hurnard, The Jury of Presentment and the Assize of Clarendon, 56 ENG. Htsr. REV. 374, 391 
(1941). 
9. See H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND FROM 
THE CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA 198-202 (1963). Green indicates that his remarks about the 
Assize of Clarendon may only be applicable to later practice. P. 7 n.17. 
10. Groot, The Jury in Criminal Prosecutions Before 1215, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 113 
(1983); Groot, supra note 8. 
11. Hyams, Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law, in ON THE LA ws 
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 90, 98-100 (M. Arnold, T. Green, s. Scully & s. White eds. 1981). 
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question, 12 it was probably essentially moral. 
Word usage illustrates the difference between the factual question 
and the moral question. Coroners' rolls reported that an individual 
fe/onice interfecit: he feloniously slew (p. 35). The accusation was 
fact-oriented, about a past event and intent. The jury's verdict, how-
ever, was present tense and concerned guilt: cu/pabilis est (he is 
guilty). Properly the concern was not only with the commission of the 
crime but also with present stance - the appropriateness of punish-
ment now. That concern could include repentance, reputation, repa-
ration, recidivism. God, however, might be more forgiving than the 
accused's community, and certainly more forgiving than the king. 
Green asserts that these questions later seem to have been relevant for 
trial juries (pp. 64, 98, 380). The concerns were plausibly original. 
The moral nature of the ordeal question finds some basis in literary 
accounts. In La Mort le Roi Artu 13 from around 1230 Sir Lancelot 
killed Sir Gawain's brother, and Gawain rightfully wanted revenge: 
Lancelot had clearly committed the homicide. Lancelot, however, of-
fered reparation: he abased himself, offered to do homage ~o Gawain 
and to go on pilgrimage alone. Gawain refused to accept this ex-
traordinary offer from a very proud knight and insisted on proceeding 
instead to battle. Sir Yvain, good friend to Gawain, thereafter scolded 
him for not accepting Lancelot's reparation: 
"My Lord, why have you undertaken this battle, and wrongly too, be-
cause he will defend himself with justice on his side? You have certainly 
never done anything so foolhardy. 
"He made such a great offer there," said Sir Yvain, "that I can only see 
unreason on our side in Gawain's refusal. May God grant that things do 
not tum out too badly for us, because I have certainly never feared disas-
ter as much as I do now; I see right on their side and wrong on ours."14 
And indeed, after a long-fought battle - to show the balance between 
Lancelot's reparation and his guilt of the factual past event - Lance-
lot successfully proved his innocence.15 "Innocence" here, however, 
only concerned present inappropriateness of punishment. An offer of 
reparation, refused, reversed the appropriate result. This account of a 
trial by battle suggests strongly a similar conclusion about the ordeal. 
The question asked was not factual but moral, not about a past event 
but about present standing before God. 
A tenth-century account of an ordeal yields a similar framework. 
12. The Assize of Clarendon, c. 2, requires that the oath preceding the ordeal be factual: "so 
far as he knows, he has not been a robber or murderer or thief, or a receiver of them, since the 
lord king has been king." SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 2, at 
77. That oath was not the typical ordeal oath, but it reflected the immediate royal concern. 
13. THE DEATH OF KING ARTHUR (J. Cable trans. 1971). 
14. Id. at 177-78. 
15. Id. at 179-85. 
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A slave had committed a crime, unknown to his master. The master 
offered to give the presiding official both the slave and a pound of sil-
ver to save the slave's life; the slave's relatives also made proffers. The 
reeve, however, was arrogant. He put the slave to the ordeal of fire, 
heating the unjustly large piece of iron unusually hot. The slave ex-
perienced pain; and the community, observing the healing process, 
saw the signs of guilt: pus and decay. The slave himself was guilty. 
But the arrogant official did not see those signs and, humiliatingly, had 
to pronounce the slave innocent.16 Vis-a-vis the master, the official 
was in the wrong, because he had refused appropriate reparation. The 
ordeal yielded not a factual answer about a past event, but an evalua-
tion appropriate for God: the calculus of present moral standing, al-
beit related to the past factual event. 
Henry H's concern with the ordeal, then, would not indicate that 
the ordeal was in disrepute. Henry was more concerned with the fac-
tual than with the moral question. Disreputable people caught with 
stolen goods did not go to the ordeal.17 Bad reputation could exile one 
cleared by the ordeal.18 The ordeal was simply fashioned for a differ-
ent question. Since the ordeal concerned present moral status, com-
munity certainty about commission of the crime would not be 
discordant with an acquittal. The ordeal could fall into disrepute only 
when theologians opposed demanding an answer from God or when 
kings decided that factual questions were of paramount importance. 
That conceptualization of the ordeal explains trial jury discretion. 
The trial jury was the proof hesitantly substituted for the ordeal when 
the Fourth Lateran Council prohibited the participation of clerics. 
Monarchs were not sufficiently dissatisfied with the ordeal to abolish it 
on their own or to have a ready substitute. But the trial jury, replacing 
the ordeal, could render a general verdict concerning guilt in the pres-
ent tense. If the ordeal investigated present moral status, the trial jury 
could naturally have undertaken such matters also. Nor would the 
bench at first have been shocked that it did. The question put to the 
jury would itself tend to continue that concern, although the Crown's 
interest in the factual question would generate some tension. Jury nul-
lification of the law is more intrinsic to the trial jury than even Green 
suspected. 
The continuation of that discretion was not simply inertia. Green 
senses the bench's concern about jury nullification in its sensitivity to 
self-defense verdicts (pp. 67-68). The concern, however, could not 
have been great. Those same justices presided over property cases in 
which a jury, in an action on a writ of entry, could retail a version of a 
16. Hyams, supra note 11, at 93-94. Hyams uses the account to stress the political nature of 
community life, rather than reflecting on the nature of the question being asked. 
17. Assize of Clarendon, c. 12. 
18. Assize of Clarendon, c. 14. 
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factual situation that directly contradicted the account rendered pur-
suant to a writ of novel disseisin. 19 In such cases the jury was appar-
ently nullifying the law in favor of a "just" result. Nor was attaint the 
brutal instrument it might seem. Justices only amerced jurors con-
victed by attaint when the verdict had been complicated with law.20 
The issue of the grand assize,21 moreover, compelled jurors to consider 
a complex of both law and fact. Justices were sufficiently comfortable 
with jurors meddling in law that it took a statute to compel them to 
allow the jurors in an assize of novel disseisin to render a special ver-
dict.22 In many areas justices were accustomed to seeing juries handle 
law. 
Justices also were familiar with the problems inherent in trespass, 
with its fictional allegation of jurisdictional codes. Those allegations 
allowed inappropriate suits to enter the king's court in disguise.23 For 
the system to work, juries had to overlook the jurisdictional words. 
To give justice in the case, the jurors had to render a verdict under 
oath that was not strictly true, but rather somewhat embroidered. 
This situation is particularly interesting. Trespass was a wrong closely 
associated with crime, and it used the same general issue. Why would 
justices feel more uncomfortable with the criminal jury than with 
other juries? In short, the concern felt by medieval justices at jury 
nullification could not have been too deep; the criminal trial jury was 
no different from other juries. These concerns integrate the history of 
the criminal trial jury with the history of English law as such. They 
also explain the continuity of criminal jury interventjon in medieval 
England. 
The self-informing character of the jury plays a large role in 
Green's analysis. He supposes, guardedly, that the jury remained 
mainly self-informing until the mid-fifteenth century (p. 105). Theim-
plication is that evidence was not presented until then. But already in 
the 1290s the presentation of evidence was separate from pleading in 
trials concerning property.24 The expectation that evidence would be 
19. See R. PALMER, THE WHILTON DISPUTE, 1264-1380: A SOCIAL-LEGAL STUDY OF DIS-
PUTE SETTLEMENT IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 119-22 (1984). 
20. Id. at 78-83. 
21. The issue is "who has greater right,'' representing a complex mixture of law and fact. 
THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED 
GLANVILL 33 (G. Hall ed. & trans. 1965). 
22. Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 30. 
23. S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 286-90 (2d ed. 1981). 
24. See R. PALMER, supra note 19, at 228-31. The first form of evidence in property cases 
was probably written evidence, which could not be thrust on the jurors: they had to ask for it. 
In the 1290s the party or his lawyer could present the facts as he saw them, although there was 
no submission Of testimony under oath or formal cross-examination. Id. In the criminal case, 
counsel was not formally allowed and the accused was specifically not to testify under oath. 
Testifying under oath, it should be noted, was not a burden, but a benefit, since it reinforced the 
credibility of the testimony given. 
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presented, as well as the procedures for punishing maintenance, would 
not encourage the noncriminal trial jury to engage in information-
gathering. And if the jury was essentially not self-informing in non-
criminal areas, the jurors in a criminal trial might well not expect to be 
self-informing either. The first form of evidence to be expected would 
be the accused's version of the facts. The standardized renditions of 
self-defense situations could thus be as much a result of jury accept-
ance of the accused's story as of jury fabrication of a story of its own. 25 
The judges might then have commented on such evidence. We do not 
know. But if the criminal trial jury remained self-informing for two 
centuries longer than other juries, that would be both surprising and 
interesting. 
The few surviving reports of criminal cases would have fortified 
Green's treatment. 26 They graphically illustrate the unmediated con-
frontation between the justice and the accused. 27 But they also show 
that strict pleading carried over from the common law. One justice 
was willing to ignore double jeopardy considerations because of the 
order of pleading. 28 These reports are too interesting to pass by 
lightly.29 
Green notes that the criminal trial jury was immune from attaint 
process. He rejects, properly, the argument that that immunity was a 
holdover from the divine orientation of the ordeal. He prefers the ex-
planation that jury discretion simply was always a given (pp. 19-20). 
His explanation is not completely satisfying. There are two instances 
in which attaint was allowed on criminal trial juries in Guernsey and 
Jersey.30 Subjecting the criminal trial jury to attaint was thus not un-
25. At one point Green allows that the accused might have told his story. P. 96. That would 
make good sense from the 1290s on. If the accused told his own story, the jury might simply 
follow that account. That form of proceeding would yield a rather more passive jury interven-
tion than Green envisages. Overall he supposes a very active jury, one that purposely embroi-
dered the facts. If the jury merely followed the lead of the accused, one would then have to 
account for the characterization that such accused persons used. In part, people would simply 
have known how to characterize what had happened: they had seen criminal trials, been on 
criminal juries, or heard of cases. In part, however, they would have been informed of the proper 
defense by lawyers. Although they ought not to have had access to counsel, those accused still 
could rely on their lawyers. Dufflzus v. Merk is a case in which a lawyer lost his retainer for not 
rendering advice to one indicted for homicide, despite the fact that by law he ought not to have 
done so. Palmer, The Origins of the Legal Profession in England, 11 IRISH JURIST (n.s.) 126, 130-
31 (1976). 
26. 3 YEAR BOOKS OF THE REIGN OF KING Eow ARD THE FIRST 528-45 (1863) [hereinafter 
cited as YEAR BOOKS]. Other criminal reports have survived, but they are not as illuminating on 
these points as those from the 1290s. See 1 THE EYRE OF NORTHAMPTONSHIRE, 1329-1330, at 
151-244 (D. Sutherland ed. & trans. 1983). 
27. 3 YEAR BOOKS, supra note 26, at 529-32. 
28. Id. at 537. 
29. Green adverts to these reports only by way of Summerson's paper. Pp. 15 n.47, 18 n.58. 
30. [E]adem jurata dicebat ipsum esse infidelem inponens ei crimen latrocinii, unde idem 
Galfridus occasione veredicti illius jurate fugit ad ecclesiam . . • . Quia vero idem Galfridus 
postea ad nos accessit et optulit ponere se super veredictum xxiiij. proborum et legalium 
hominum trium vicinarum villatarum de crimine illo, et petiit a nobis id ei concedi, tibi 
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thinkable. In those two cases, however, the plaintiff had escaped and 
was outside the appropriate jurisdiction. Those convicted within Eng-
land were hanged so quickly, perhaps, that no substantial body of 
complainants survived to make such reconsiderations worth a regular 
remedy. Beyond that practical lack of pressure, the criminal trial jury 
probably seemed more like the grand assize, which was never subject 
to attaint. Both the grand assize and the criminal trial jury considered 
the broadest possible relevant question and were concerned with 
finality. 31 
The medieval part of Green's book requires some alterations. 
None of them, however, affects the main thesis. And the utility of his 
framework is that it both encourages the formulation of questions and 
suggests the significance of possible answers. 
* * * * * * 
Verdict According to Conscience is intentionally episodic. Green 
refers to his book as a series of essays (p. ix). The book is much more 
than that, although it does fall short of an integrated history of the 
criminal jury. The omissions, thus, are worthy of note, at least to indi-
cate further avenues into the subject. 32 Those areas include the early 
seventeenth-century history of the criminal trial jury, the role of 
Magna Carta, c. 29,33 and the nature of seventeenth-century treatises. 
Green's treatment of the seventeenth-century jury concentrates on 
the trials of Lilbume, Penn, and Bushel. That is indeed where the 
major emphasis should fall. A comprehensive treatment, however, 
would include the Petition of Right. 34 The Petition of Right was a 
source of Lilburne's thought.35 One of the concerns in the Petition 
was martial law prosecutions for ordinary felony cases; it referred spe-
cifically to Magna Carta, c. 29.36 The argument had to go beyond 
mere due process to a claim of trial by jury. The growing opposition 
precipimus quod secundum consuetudinem predicte insule juratam xxiiij. proborum et 
legalium hominum ei inde habere facias .... 
2 CLOSE ROLLS OF THE REIGN OF HENRY Ill PRESERVED IN THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 
597-98 (1905); see also 3 id. at 172, 177, 334, 355, 511. 
31. This suggestion is original. Milsom has accepted a different argument: that attaint was 
not available on a criminal trial jury because the ·~ury was the defendant's own proof, chosen by 
himself." S. MILSOM, supra note 23, at 411. The accused, however, did not actually choose his 
jurors. He could only challenge jurors, and the challenges would be tried. Moreover, it is hard 
to believe that choice had any influence on the availability of attaint on the petty assizes. 
32. One omission, probably wisely made, is the perplexing problem of whether or not there 
was an increase in crime during times of food shortage. Even though this might have been a 
major area of jury intervention, the whole subject is still so controverted that little can be con-
cluded thus far. 
33. l SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 2, at 115. Note that the 
classical c. 29 was c. 39 in the 1215 version of the Magna Carta. 
34. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, TuE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 19-21 (1971). 
35. See L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 289 (1968). 
36. l B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, at 20-21. 
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to Charles I at the time of the Petition was such that juries would have 
tended to be merciful. Royal use of martial law acknowledged that 
possibility. The importance is not less for being implicit. The force of 
Lilburne's argument rested in part on its foundation in the Petition of 
Right. 
Both Lilburne and the Quakers relied on Magna Carta, c. 29, in 
asserting jury control over the law. Green dissects the course of the 
debate that led up to Vaughan's decision in Bushel's Case but pays 
little attention to the role of Magna Carta. The history of Magna 
Carta in the seventeenth century, however, may be particularly rele-
vant. That provision concerned proceedings "by lawful judgment of 
his peers or by the law of the land."37 "Lawful judgment of his peers" 
had originally referred to judgment by feudal court, which was a true 
communal court that did not use juries.38 The community, one's 
peers, rendered judgments, not verdicts. The presiding officer merely 
presided. Equation of "peers" with members of the trial jury,39 how-
ever, yields the odd result that a jury could render a judgment ("by the 
lawful judgment of his peers"), whereas juries properly gave verdicts 
and justices rendered judgments. 
That historically accidental linguistic paradox probably played a 
substantial role in the more radical theories calling for jury control of 
the law. Green's rendition of even Starling's commentary on Penn 
would indicate such an interpretation: 
The defendants, [Starling] continued, misinterpreted Magna Carta's 
most famous chapter. "By lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of 
the land" did not guarantee trial by peers who acted as judges. As it was 
in the "disjunctive," the Crown might employ the "law of the land," 
which must mean trial by both judge and jury ("peers"). [p. 229] 
Starling seemed to accept that the first part of the disjunctive provision 
would yield jurors as judges. The Crown, however, could choose to 
utilize also the second half, which introduced a more substantial role 
for the justices. Green does not delve into this linguistic derivation of 
jury right; it would be interesting to know how important it was. 
Seventeenth-century treatises raise an equally interesting question. 
Writers worked in a seeming air of unreality. How could it have been 
a matter of controversy whether attaint lay on a criminal trial jury? 
Attaint had never been available on properly English criminal juries 
(pp. 19-20). The last expansion of attaint was in 1275.40 But since the 
petty assizes had largely gone out of use, so had the attaint.4t The 
37. 1 SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 2, at 121. 
38. Palmer, Economic and Cultural Impact, supra note 4, at 392-95. 
39. That equation can already be observed in the 1290s. 3 YEAR BOOKS, supra note 26, at 
531. 
40. Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 38 (1275), expanded attaint from the posses-
sory assizes to other inquests relating to free tenements, subject to special mandate from the king. 
41. J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 117 (2d ed. 1979), 
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discussion was academic, but also pressing. The old writs were valua-
ble sources of legal principle, even if they were no longer in use; that 
style of argument is familiar both from Coke42 and from Blackstone.43 
The minor debate over attaint must seem perplexing without reference 
to the character of seventeenth-century legal debate. 
The argument of Chapter Four, it should be noted, is somewhat 
strained. That chapter is the institutional overview and serves to es-
tablish the continuity of jury nullification, albeit at a lesser level than 
in the fourteenth century. Less ground work has been done in com-
mon-run felony. Green realizes that the argument is strained (pp. 150-
52), but he is convincing nonetheless. Given both the fifteenth- and 
seventeenth-century record, it would be very hard to imagine six-
teenth-century juries as completely passive and never inclined to 
render merciful verdicts. 
* * * * * * 
One of the more interesting aspects of eighteenth-century treatises 
dealing with the jury in seditious libel prosecutions is the choice of 
analogies. Pro-jury writers analogized seditious libel to homicide. 
Green points out the strength of the homicide analogy and raises as his 
own alternative an analogy to theft (pp. 343-45). Since homicide can 
be justified or properly excused, juries in homicide cases have a larger 
role and thus a greater capacity for intervention. Theft would have 
provided an analogy more favorable to traditional seditious libel 
doctrine. 
But the choice between homicide and theft is somewhat more com-
plex. Hamburger, in a recent article on seditious libel,44 reaches a dif-
ferent conclusion. Homicide, he says, produced a rebuttable 
presumption of malice; larceny produced no such presumption, so that 
it was better to acquit in doubtful cases.45 For Hamburger, an analogy 
with larceny would have yielded not a stronger but a more lenient law 
of seditious libel. 
The impact of the analogy with theft is perhaps less important than 
the possible impact of blasphemy and obscenity. Historians have 
treated seditious libel as an isolated category. But blasphemous and 
obscene libel were also criminal libels, exactly analogous to seditious 
libel.46 The law for criminal libel was consistent, and Fox's Libel 
Act47 in terms concerned criminal libel and apparently applied also to 
42. See 12 E. COKE, REPORTS 74; s. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND "THE GRIEVANCES 
OF THE COMMONWEALTH," 1621-1628, at 51-52 (1979). 
43. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *268-69. 
44. Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1985). Green uses the article. P. 253 n.208. 
45. Hamburger, supra note 44, at 704 (citing both Coke and Hale). 
46. Blackstone treats them all together. 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *150-51. 
47. 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (1792). 
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blasphemous and obscene libel. Blasphemy and obscenity in the eigh-
teenth century could hardly have seemed justifiable or properly excus-
able. Seditious libel might seem likewise unexcusable, such that from 
a merely legal perspective only the fact of publication would remain 
for jury determination. That stronger analogy renders the old doc-
trine of seditious libel somewhat more understandable. 
Verdict According to Conscience is well-written, thoughtful, and 
thought-provoking. Green admirably pulls together current research 
and provides a structure for future research on the criminal trial jury. 
No work of this scope can be definitive. Nor did Green intend to be 
definitive in setting out these essays. His book will be subject to con-
tinuing attack on many fronts, as others fill omissions in his coverage 
and correct elements of his thesis. That is the burden of making a 
broad contribution to a subject rich in specialized researchers. His 
basic thesis will survive. But the book was not even intended to stand 
forever. By providing a coherent focus and context for the subject, 
Verdict According to Conscience will further the specialized research 
that will make it obsolete. For now, however, it is the mandatory 
starting point for understanding the history of the criminal trial jury. 
